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Policing, Professionalism and Liability for Negligence  
Joanne Conaghan and Clare Torrible, University of Bristol Law School (forthcoming Journal of 
Professional Negligence (2017)) 
 
Abstract 
Should the police be subject to a duty of care in relation to their investigative and crime-suppressing 
functions? The current position, as recently reaffirmed in Michael v South Wales Police (2015) is that 
they should not. There is however a lack of cohesion in the courts’ reasoning on this point in the line 
of cases since Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police first addressed the issue. Further in 
Michael, a separate claim, relying on human rights law, has been allowed to proceed and a similar 
claim against the police for failings in the context of a rape investigation has recently come before 
the Supreme Court in D v Chief Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police (judgment pending).  This 
article considers whether the concept of professionalism can cast new light on the doctrinal and 
policy dilemmas the courts encounter in determining the scope of police liability in such 
circumstances. It explores ideas of professionalism, drawing on the sociological literature and looks 
at how these ideas take legal shape and form in the field of professional negligence, focusing in 
particular on the ways professionalism has informed the scope and content of the duty of care. 
Thereafter, the article explores the instrumental benefits that professional status affords the police, 
reflecting on these in the context of relevant case law and considering the extent to which they bear 
upon the question of whether and when the police should owe members of the public a duty of 
care. It concludes by suggesting that the recently observable shift towards viewing policing as a 
profession adds further weight to arguments in favour of recognising a duty of care in relation to 
core police functions at least in some instances 
 
1 Introduction  
It is a tremendous honour to participate in this symposium celebrating the work of our colleague, 
Keith Stanton.  Over the last 40 years, Keith has been at the vanguard of tort scholarship, critically 
charting the doctrinal ebbs and flows as judges strive – and often struggle – to render the law of tort 
coherent and just, principled and practical, stable and responsive to the challenges posed by social, 
economic and technological change.  As co-author of a leading textbook and co-founder of the 
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leading journal,1 Keith’s name has become virtually synonymous with the field of professional 
negligence. It is perhaps no surprise then to discover that Keith approaches his area of specialism 
with the fond ambivalence of a parent who sees a child developing in ways which are both 
unforeseen and not entirely welcome. Keith came to negligence just as Lord Atkins’ famous 
neighbour principle2 was reaching the zenith of its influence, offering the promise of unity to a tort 
traditionally conceived as fragmented and diffuse. His concern was – and still is – to promote a 
judicial approach to the resolution of negligence claims which meets the demands of individual 
justice while fostering the construction of a doctrinal framework which is coherent and navigable. 
These considerations have featured frequently in Keith’s scholarship, in particular in his cautious 
assessment of the long slow decline of the neighbour principle post- Anns3 and the corresponding 
emergence of a potpourri of judicial techniques to manage and contain the expansionist tendencies 
which Donoghue v Stevenson appeared to unleash. In a series of articles4 Keith has highlighted the 
variety of approaches the courts have taken to the question of whether and when a duty of care 
should arise, contrasting the unifying impetus of the neighbour principle with the now more 
prevalent judicial tendency to cultivate distinct ‘pockets’ of negligence liability in different contexts.5  
At the root of pockets thinking, Keith argues, are policy considerations which inform the judicial 
approach to the imposition of liability in discrete contexts.6 Policy here colludes with 
incrementalism, the judicial inclination to ‘develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and 
by analogy with existing categories’.7 The end result is an increasingly splintered doctrinal 
framework in which a disposition not to extend the scope and range of duty situations is formally 
incorporated into judicial deliberations.  
This is the point where Keith’s concerns resonate with our own interest in whether and/or when the 
police owe a duty of care to individuals in the course of carrying out their investigative and crime-
suppressing functions. A focal point of contestation since first considered in Hill v Chief Constable of 
                                                          
1 Keith was among six co-founders of the Journal of Professional Negligence in 1984. The first edition of A 
Dugdale and K Stanton, Professional Negligence appeared in 1982. It has since gone to three editions.  
2 ‘You must take reasonable care to avoid acts and omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely 
to injure your neighbour’ Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 580.  
3 Anns v Merton London BC [1978] AC 728. 
4 K Stanton ‘Incremental approaches to the duty of care’ in Mullany, N (ed) Torts in the Nineties (1997); 
‘Professional negligence: duty of care methodology in the twenty-first century’ (2006) 22 PN 134; ‘Decision-
making in the tort of negligence in the House of Lords’ (2007) 15 Tort L Rev 93; ‘Use of scholarship by House of 
Lords in tort cases’  in Lee J (ed) From House of Lords to Supreme Court (2011); ‘The neighbour principle in the 
twenty-first century: yesterday’s revolution’ (2012) 20 Tort L Rev 61. 
5 See especially (2012) 20 Tort L Rev 61. 
6 Ibid at 70-71. 
7 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR at 481 per Brennan J (High Court of Australia) and later 
endorsed by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 398 and Murphy v Brentwood 
District Council [1991] 1 AC 398.  
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West Yorkshire Police,8 the dominant judicial tendency has been to push back against attempts to 
recognise the possibility of negligence liability where individuals are adversely affected by police 
failures to protect them from third party criminal acts or to investigate those acts with due care.9 
Nevertheless, the issue has continued to find its way to the courts, culminating most recently in 
Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police,10 a decision which might be thought to put to rest 
speculation on a question which has preoccupied the courts now for some decades. Upholding a 
striking out application, the Supreme Court decided that neither South Wales nor Gwent Police 
owed a duty of care to Joanna Michael, whose brutal murder by her ex-partner might have been 
avoided had the police responded promptly to her desperate 999 call.  Speaking for the majority, 
Lord Toulson held that no duty arose from a ‘pure omission’11 and that with respect to the 
application of this common law principle the police were subject to the same rules as private 
citizens.12 Because the police failure to protect the complainant from a third party criminal act fell 
within the category of omission, no liability ensued except where responsibility for the 
complainant’s safety was assumed by the police and reliance placed by the complainant upon that 
assumption (circumstances which, according to his Lordship and not uncontroversially, were not 
present in Michael).13  
Lord Toulson briefly considered the public policy arguments repeatedly invoked by judges to support 
a protective stance in relation to police liability.14 These arguments, first articulated by Lord Keith in 
Hill,15 encompass a range of concerns including: that liability would not encourage the police to 
observe a higher standard of care (as they were in need of no such motivation): that liability might 
however lead them to carry out their duties ‘in a detrimentally defensive frame of mind’16; that the 
courts would be drawn into inappropriate deliberations about operational matters best determined 
by the police themselves; and finally that the time, trouble and expense to which the police would 
be put in mounting a defence to liability claims would result in a ‘significant diversion of police 
manpower and attention from their most important function, that of the suppression of crime’.17  
                                                          
8 [1989] 1 AC 53. 
9 Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344 (CA); Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 
24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495; Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police; Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex 
Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225.   
10 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732. 
11 Ibid at para 97. 
12 Ibid at para 101. See also para 116: ‘the question is not therefore whether the police should have a special 
immunity, but whether an exception should be made to the ordinary application of common law principles’.  
13 Ibid at paras 99-100 & 138.  
14 Ibid at paras 121-122. 
15 Supra n 8 at 63. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid.  
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In the later case of Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis,18 Lord Steyn expressed some 
reservations about the breadth of the assertions in Hill, particularly Lord Keith’s confident 
pronouncement that the police could be trusted always to apply ‘their best endeavours’ to the 
performance of their functions.19 ‘Nowadays’, Lord Steyn acknowledged, ‘a more sceptical approach 
to the carrying out of all public functions is necessary’.20  However, his Lordship went on to reiterate 
with approval the core policy concerns:   
A retreat from the principle in Hill's case would have detrimental effects for law 
enforcement. Whilst focusing on investigating crime, and the arrest of suspects, police 
officers would in practice be required to ensure that in every contact with a potential 
witness or a potential victim, time and resources were deployed to avoid the risk of causing 
harm or offence. Such legal duties would tend to inhibit a robust approach in assessing a 
person as a possible suspect, witness or victim. By placing general duties of care on the 
police to victims and witnesses the police's ability to perform their public functions in the 
interests of the community, fearlessly and with despatch, would be impeded. It would, as 
was recognised in Hill's case, be bound to lead to an unduly defensive approach in 
combating crime.21 
In Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,22 most of their Lordships were happy uncritically to 
endorse the policy position adopted in Brooks, denying a duty of care in circumstances where the 
police failure to protect the complainant, in the face of repeated threats ultimately resulting in 
serious physical harm, was particularly egregious.23 By contrast, Lord Toulson in Michael, recognising 
no doubt the force of repeated criticisms of the policy assumptions underpinning Hill, was insistent 
that principle, not policy, should ultimately determine the outcome of the case.24  
It is fair to say that Michael has provoked mixed reactions. Some people welcome the return to 
principle25 while others lament what they view as an unnecessarily restrictive stance on the question 
of whether and when the police should owe a duty of care in relation to their investigative and 
crime-suppressing functions.26 The fact that two members of the Supreme Court, Lord Kerr and Lady 
Hale, dissented from the majority decision does not breed confidence that the matter has been 
                                                          
18 [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495. 
19 Hill, supra n 8 at 63 per Lord Keith cited by Lord Steyn in Brooks, supra n 18 at para 28. 
20 Ibid at para 28. 
21 Ibid at para 30. 
22 [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225. 
23 Though see Lord Bingham’s dissenting judgment, ibid at paras 49-52 (considered further below).  
24 Michael (supra n 10 at paras 115-116). 
25 N McBride, ‘Michael and the future of tort law’ (2016) 32 PN 14. 
26 S Tofaris and S Steel ‘Negligence liability for omissions and the police’ [2016] CLJ 128. 
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determinately settled. Moreover, the shift from policy to principle in the majority judgment leaves 
open for future determination the extent to which past decisions on the boundaries of police liability 
– which placed considerably more weight upon policy arguments - align with the application of this 
new principled approach. At the very least it could be argued that in some of the cases where a duty 
of care has been previously denied, the conduct of the police would struggle to fit the category of 
‘pure omission’.27 Equally vague, post-Michael, is the nature or extent of the ‘responsibility’ the 
police or the private citizen may be said to have assumed in a particular instance.28 Keith Stanton is 
among a number of scholars who have argued that ‘assumption of responsibility’ is not a particularly 
effective technique for determining when a duty of care is owed. It will be a rare case, he argues, 
where an explicit assumption of responsibility for the interests of another will give rise to legal 
contention, so that in most cases the court is being asked to address the question of whether 
responsibility has been implicitly assumed or should be deemed to be assumed from the 
circumstances.29 Far from putting the question of duty to rest, Michael arguably leaves a good deal 
still to be resolved.30  
In the light of this continued uncertainty, we seek to consider the decision in Michael, along with the 
case law upon which it purports to rest, from a fresh angle, one which troubles Lord Toulson’s 
intuitively suspect alignment of the police with private citizens when it comes to protecting 
individuals from crime. As Lord Kerr observes: ‘The police have been empowered to protect the 
public from harm’.31 Unlike private citizens, protecting the public from criminals is the role police 
officers are charged to perform; they are professionals when it comes to fighting crime. What, if any, 
significance should we attach to this, particularly in the context of tort law, where professional 
status has commonly informed the nature and scope of the duty of care owed? This article considers 
whether the concept of professionalism can cast new light on the doctrinal and policy dilemmas the 
courts encounter in determining the scope of police liability in negligence. It begins by exploring 
                                                          
27 In both Osman and Smith (supra n 9), it could be argued that given the ongoing relationship between the 
police and the claimant, the police did not so much fail to act as act carelessly; equally it could be argued that 
the police had assumed a responsibility. In Brooks (supra n 18) the claim is of a different nature - not a failure 
to protect but a failure to treat the claimant with the care and respect to which he was entitled as a witness to 
a serious crime. Here it is only with considerable linguistic contortion that one can construe police failings as a 
‘pure omission’.      
28 Lord Toulson devotes surprisingly limited attention to this issue (Michael supra n 10 at paras 100 and 138).  
29 Stanton (2006) 22 PN 134 at 138-139. 
30 A further wrinkle of uncertainty arises from the possibility of bringing a claim against the police under the 
Human Rights Act 1998, which the Supreme Court in Michael allowed to proceed. See also D v Commissioner 
of Police for the Metropolis [2015] EWCA Civ 646, [2016] QB 161, which is currently before the Supreme Court. 
As McBride observes, ‘two bodies of law saying different things in the same jurisdiction on the same issue 
cannot long survive together; one invariably swallows up the other’ (supra n 25 at 26).  The likely repeal of the 
HRA may well force confrontation/resolution of this issue sooner rather than later.  
31 Michael, supra n 10 at para 181. 
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ideas of professionalism, drawing in particular on sociological literature. It then looks at how these 
ideas take legal shape and form in the field of professional negligence, focusing in particular on the 
ways professionalism has informed the scope and content of the duty of care. Thereafter, the article 
probes understandings of the police as professionals, including in the relevant case law, and 
considers the extent to which such understandings bear upon the question of whether and when the 
police should owe members of the public a common law duty of care. We conclude by suggesting 
that the recently observable shift towards viewing policing as a profession adds further weight to 
arguments in favour of recognising a duty of care in relation to core police functions at least in some 
instances. .   
2 The nature of professionalism  
There is a vast sociological literature on the subject of professions which is not generally explored by 
legal academics and only rarely brought to bear upon questions of professional liability.32 
Nevertheless, for both legal and social science scholars, a clear definition of the term ‘professional’ 
has remained elusive. As a designation which is more ‘honorific than technical’,33 the notion of 
professionalism is both socially constructed and temporally and spatially bound. Consequently, not 
only do the definitional parameters of professionalism remain contested but the perceived 
significance and merits of professional status vary over place and time.34 
This instability of the concept notwithstanding, it is possible to sketch an outline of some commonly 
recurring components of professional status. The professional has high social standing and the 
professional domain is regarded as one of public service in that it relates to ‘our most important 
social functions’.35 Professional practice generally requires extensive tertiary study and technical 
vocational training.36 Moreover, the nature of the work undertaken is of such complexity that high 
levels of discretion and discernment are required to perform it successfully.37 A corollary is that 
quality of performance is best judged by those who are similarly qualified.38 This in turn permits the 
profession to seek a state-sanctioned mandate to self-regulate through its professional 
                                                          
32 A recent exception here is R Jackson ‘The professions: power, privilege and legal liability’ (2015) 31 PN 122, 
125-129, which offers a useful overview of the sociological literature to the lawyer.   
33 A Abbott ‘The future of professions: Occupation and expertise in the age of organization’ (1991) 8 Research 
in the Sociology of Organizations 17, 18. 
34 Jackson, n 32 above. See also D Mangan ‘The curiosity of professional status’ (2014) 30 PN 74.  
35 T Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (1954) at 48. 
36 Mangan supra n 34 at 75.  
37 T H Marshall ‘The recent history of professionalism in relation to social structure and social policy’ (1939) 
5Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue Canadienne d'Economique et de Science Politique 
325, 328. 
38 M Davies, ‘The demise of professional self-regulation? Evidence from the “ideal type” professions of 
medicine and law’ (2010) 26 PN 3, 4.  
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associations.39  The resulting monopolistic place in the market is nonetheless rendered benign by the 
expectation that professionals will operate in accordance with certain moral principles 
encompassing both concern for the interests of clients and those of the broader community.40 
These components of professionalism are each vested with a large degree of indeterminacy. 
Moreover, they are generally interdependent and mutually reinforcing. For example, the elevated 
social position associated with professional status stems, in part, from the level of education and 
expertise required and the perception of professionals’ altruistic motivations towards their work. 
However, as Marshall notes ‘professions are respected because they do not strive for money, but 
they can only remain respectable if they succeed, in spite of their pecuniary indifference in making 
quite a lot of money’.41 Additionally, because by its nature the proper performance of professional 
tasks requires clients to have a significant level of trust,42 high social standing is not only a 
consequence of, but also often a prerequisite to, successful performance of the role. 
The weight and significance of each component changes with time and context. Law and medicine 
retain their status as archetypal professions.43 However, where very large legal corporations 
compete for the custom of equally large commercial concerns, the mystique derived from the notion 
of professionalism as an individual service is much eroded, and the commitment of the profession to 
the greater interests of justice more difficult to sustain.44 Similarly, the introduction of internal 
markets within the NHS and the potential to outsource work inevitably challenges traditional 
assumptions underpinning doctor-patient relationships.45 Designations of domains of 
professionalism have also altered as roles and responsibilities have become more complex. In 1991, 
for example, policing was contrasted with law as lacking the ‘esoteric and intellectual aspects of 
expert knowledge’ required for professional status.46 However, by 2003, following significant 
advancements in policing techniques consequent upon technological and business innovation, police 
claims to professional status were no longer dismissed out of hand.47 
Despite elements of indeterminacy and instability, the current sociological perspective on 
professions suggests that the commonly recurring components of professionalism identified above 
                                                          
39 E Freidson, Professionalism: The Third Logic (2001) at 12, 17. 
40 Jackson, supra n 32 at 124-25.  
41 Marshall, supra n 37 at 326.  
42 Ibid; see also Mangan supra n 36. 
43 Davies, supra n 38 at 5. 
44 Ibid at 30-31. 
45 Ibid at 21. 
46 Abbott, supra n 33 at 27. 
47 J Evetts, ‘The sociological analysis of professionalism: Occupational change in the modern world’ (2003) 18 
International Sociology 395, 399. 
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continue to have analytical purchase though the analytical stance adopted towards them has 
fluctuated. For the first part of the twentieth century, the scholarly perspective on professionalism 
was ‘largely neutral’48 seeking to distil an essence of professionalism from the distinguishing features 
of the archetypal professions.49  A second, more critical, viewpoint emerged in the post-war period, 
which focused on the monopolistic market power conferred by state-sanctioned, closed ranks of 
licensed entry into the professional realm.50 This shift in focus involved an analytical emphasis on the 
‘project of professionalisation’, understood as the means by which the power of an occupational 
group to self-regulate was acquired and maintained.51 In contrast, more recent work has emphasised 
the changing organisational structures for the delivery of archetypal professional services52 and the 
‘casual generalisation’ of contemporary usage of the term.53 Scholars note that professionalism may 
now be understood more broadly to encompass ‘workers providing services’,54 potentially including 
‘unlikely occupations’ such as ‘restaurant staff’ and ‘security personnel’.55 Consequently, some 
scholars suggest that it is no longer valuable to attempt to define and delineate professions, but 
focus instead on what is inherent in claims to professionalism.56 
To this end, it has been argued that claims to professionalism can manifest at two levels. First, they 
can come from within the occupational group itself, in which case aspirations to professional status 
are inevitably informed by the mystique surrounding professional practice stemming from the 
classical understanding of professionalism set out above.57 Macdonald refers to ‘profession’ as a ‘lay 
or folk’ term which draws on and/or is subject to contemporary public acknowledgement of 
professional status.58 In other words, the creation of occupational associations which seek or obtain 
various degrees of regulatory autonomy will not be determinative of professional standing. Instead, 
a claim to professionalism is a claim to legitimacy on the basis of competence and has to be 
                                                          
48  E Freidson, Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy, and Policy (1994) at 3. 
49 Ibid at 3-4. 
50 Ibid at 4. 
51 See T Johnson, Professions and Power (1972) and M Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (1977). 
52 Abbott supra n 33. See also Jackson supra n 32. 
53 V Fournier ‘The appeal to ‘professionalism’ as a disciplinary mechanism’ (1999) 47 Sociological Review 280, 
281. 
54 Mangan supra n 36. 
55 Fournier supra n 53 at 281. 
56 J Evetts, ‘The concept of professionalism: Professional work, professional practice and learning.’ 
International handbook of research in professional and practice-based learning (2014) 29-56. See also Fournier 
supra n 53 and Evetts supra n 47. 
57 Mangan supra n 36 at 811. 
58 K MacDonald, The Sociology of the Professions (1995) 7. 
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continuously negotiated.59 The conferral of professional status will therefore be dependent on how 
the public ‘monitor, assess and evaluate’ the occupational group.60  
A second way in which claims to professionalism can manifest is as a disciplinary mechanism61 
imposed from above. Here, claims to professionalism create an imperative within the occupational 
group to assume ‘appropriate professional identities’62 which again will be informed by the lay or 
folk understanding of those identities. Drawing on Foucault’s ideas on governmentality, Fournier 
illustrates how discourses of professionalism can potentially facilitate ‘control at a distance by 
inscribing the disciplinary logic of professionals within the person of the employees so labelled’.63 
Interestingly (and with particular regard to police claims to professionalism considered below) 
Fournier suggests that such disciplinary mechanisms may hold appeal to occupational groups in 
which it is harder to control employee conduct by more direct means.64 
Both types of claims to professionalism draw extensively on the classic (albeit contested) 
understanding of professional standing. It is valuable therefore to consider some elements of that 
model in greater depth. Three particularly interconnected components of professionalism are 
significant for our purposes here. These are the complexity and nature of the tasks undertaken, the 
quality of the relationship between professional and client, and the authority with which 
professional judgment is imbued.   
Regarding the complex nature of professional work, Freidson uses the example of a pin maker. If one 
focuses on quality and efficiency of production, the skill of an individual pin maker, no matter how 
well trained or hardworking, is unlikely to compete with pin production via a series of workers doing 
individual mechanised tasks.65 By contrast, the knowledge and skills required for professional tasks 
are complex in that they cannot be standardised in this way. Instead, the professional draws on a 
combination of high levels of general knowledge and specialised training to deliver individualised 
solutions to the issues with which s/he is confronted.66 Professional endeavour combines both 
specialised formal knowledge and tacit intellectual skills67 which the professional alone has in 
relation to that particular area of work. This however is not of itself enough to mark professions out 
from other occupational groups. It is also in the nature of professionalism that the area of social 
                                                          
59 Fournier supra n 53 at 286. 
60 MacDonald supra n 58 at 7  
61 Evetts supra n 47 at 408. 
62 Fournier supra n 53 at 290. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Freidson supra n 39 at 111.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid at 32.  
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activity combines the need for individualised attention with an overarching concern for the public 
interest.68 As Marshall remarks: ’The guilty criminal wants an acquittal, but what he needs, and what 
his lawyer must give him, is a fair trial’.69 Professional endeavour therefore implicitly entails the 
squaring of individual needs with the public good and the individualised attention of a professional 
has to be ‘conceived of in social terms’.70   
The nature of the professional realm marks the relationship between professional providers and 
their clients as distinct from other commercial and/or service relationships. The complexity of the 
tasks makes the nature of what is being done inaccessible to anyone from outside the professional 
group. They and they alone possess the knowledge and skill required to address the issues. 
Therefore, the client must trust the professional not only in relation to the degree of expertise they 
will exhibit, but also at an individual level.71 Particularly in the archetypal professions of law and 
medicine, the performance of professional tasks requires the client or patient to engage with and 
trust the practitioner by divulging personal details in respect of which professional skill and 
knowledge can be applied.72 The professional is asked to show judgement and understanding of 
human nature as well as command of the knowledge expected in their sphere of expertise; to this 
extent their whole personality must enter their work.73 Hence, one element of the mystique of 
professionalism is that what we ask of a professional cannot be bought - it can only be given.74 
The requirement for a relationship of trust is, in turn, very much connected with the third key 
element of claims to professionalism, namely the authority with which professional advice is 
imbued. That professionals’ level of expertise is unique to that occupational group and area of 
practice inevitably gives their advice something of a commanding quality.75 This authority is further 
enhanced by claims to altruism in the exercise of their functions. Freidson refers to professionalism 
as a ‘secular calling’76: ‘The professional ideology of service goes beyond serving others’ choices. 
Rather it claims devotion to a transcendent value which infuses its specialisation with a putatively 
higher goal […] Justice, Salvation, Beauty Truth, Health’.77 Thus, a claim to professionalism is also a 
claim to authority based on the unique level of expertise asserted, combined with the public role the 
professional purports to assume and further heightened by the assertion of some benevolent 
                                                          
68 Marshall supra n 37 at 328. See also Evetts supra n 47 at 400. 
69 Marshall supra n 37 at 330.  
70 Marshall, supra n 37 at 332. 
71 Ibid at 328.  
72 Evetts supra n 47 at 400. 
73 Marshall, supra n 37 at 328. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Parsons supra n 35 at 38. 
76 Freidson supra n 39 at 107. 
77 Ibid at 122. 
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metaphysical end. Authority of this nature is inevitably difficult to question. Designations of 
professionalism not only confer higher standing but help to shield professionals from excessive 
external scrutiny. This becomes clearer when we look at how notions of professionalism have 
operated in negligence law.     
 
3 Professional Negligence    
A significant hallmark of ‘the professions’ which has understandably not featured in the sociological 
literature is that the occupational activities of professionals often attract differential treatment in 
the courts. In particular, the archetypal professions of medicine and law have both enjoyed some 
level of judicial protection. Thus the case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee78 
doctrinally enshrined a ‘hands-off’ approach to judicial scrutiny of medical decision-making while the 
conduct of cases by legal advocates has until relatively recently benefited from various levels of 
liability immunity.79 Arguably, some differential treatment by the courts is an inevitable 
consequence of the nature of the professional role. While a shop keeper or a building contractor 
may be in a position to guarantee their product, a doctor cannot promise a full recovery and the 
outcome of a trial will often turn on matters beyond the control of the advocate.80 Hence a starting 
assumption of law is that those who enter ‘learned profession[s]’ do ‘not undertake to use the 
highest possible degree of skill but … to bring a fair, reasonable and competent degree of skill’.81  
This approach should however be viewed in light of the nature of the professional realm, which as 
noted above, encompasses both collective and individual dimensions. Professionals need the 
collective authority of their standing to instil the individual trust essential to the proper performance 
of their role in particular instances. The differential treatment of professional groups as a whole in 
relation to negligence claims may therefore be linked, at least in part, to concerns that questioning 
professional authority is not in the collective interest.  
Nevertheless, and in line with the changing perceptions of professionalism noted above, the courts 
have increasingly felt the need to reframe and/or revisit justifications for professional immunity or 
protection in relation to negligent professional conduct. They have gradually drawn back from the 
deferential approach to professional judgement evidenced in Bolam, most notably in Bolitho v City 
                                                          
78 [1957] 1 WLR 582.     
79 See especially Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191 and Arthur Hall v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 (discussed below). 
For detailed discussion of the law on professional immunities, see M Davies, The Law of Professional 
Immunities (2014).    
80 R Jackson and J Powell, Jackson and Powell on Professional Liability (2012) 2-004. 
81 Lanphier v Phipos (1838) 8 C & P 475.  
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and Hackney Health Authority.82 The status and application of the Bolam principle has been further 
eroded in the recent case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board83 in which the doctrine of 
informed consent has been judicially reworked better to encompass the viewpoint and needs of the 
(reasonable) patient facing treatment. This latter development is indicative of a trend towards 
greater recognition of individual interests, hitherto treated as secondary to the collective interest in 
the smooth running of the general professional endeavour.  
Changes to the privileges enjoyed by the legal profession are also of interest. Historically, barristers 
were immune from suit altogether.84 In the eighteenth century the notion that an action might be 
brought against a barrister for negligent drafting was found objectionable and Jackson refers to an 
undercurrent in such cases that ‘the very idea of suing a gentleman of the bar was unthinkable’.85 By 
1969, however, it was necessary to give the unthinkable some thought. In Rondel v Worsley, prior 
deference to gentlemanly standards was replaced by policy concerns that the administration of 
justice would be hampered if barristers were unable to present their case ‘fearlessly and 
independently’.86 It would not be in the public interest, their Lordships argued, for the conduct of 
barristers to be questioned since it would lead to the re-trying of actions and prolonged litigation. 
Thus, the public interest in the proper administration of justice was seen to take precedent over the 
individual right to compensation.87 Subsequently, and perhaps not unrelated to the changing 
conceptions of professionalism noted above, such arguments in support of professional immunities 
have become increasingly difficult to sustain. Hall v Simons88 marks the point at which the policy 
concerns underpinning the decision in Rondel v Worsley were held insufficient to defeat the 
overarching requirement of justice that a wrong must be righted:   
The principle is now clearly established that where a person relies on a member of a 
profession to give him advice or otherwise to exercise his professional skills on his behalf, 
the professional man should carry out his professional task with reasonable care and if he 
fails to do so and in consequence the person who engages him or consults him suffers loss, 
he should be able to recover damages. This principle accords with what members of society 
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now expect and consider to be just and fair, and I think that it is difficult to expect that 
reasonable members of society would accept it as fair that the law should grant immunity to 
lawyers when they conduct a civil case negligently, when such immunity is not granted to 
other professional men, such as surgeons, who have to make difficult decisions in stressful 
conditions.89 
Meanwhile, as regards solicitors, their professional status and role in the community have been cited 
as reason for extending their liability for omissions in certain circumstances. Both factors were 
significant in driving the decision in White v Jones90 that a duty of care was owed to the would-be 
beneficiaries of a will which remained undrafted due to a negligent delay on the part of the lawyer. 
Here the practical justice of the situation necessitated a search for ways to overcome the contractual 
and tortious barriers to finding a duty. According to Lord Goff, a substantial element of that practical 
justice encompassed the right of citizens to leave their assets to whom they please and the 
importance of this at a general social level: ‘legacies can be of great importance to individual 
citizens, providing very often the only opportunity for a citizen to acquire a significant capital sum; or 
to inherit a house, so providing a secure roof over the heads of himself and his family; or to make 
special provision for his or her old age’.91 It was vital therefore to recognise the important role that 
solicitors play in society and the dependency of the public on the maintenance of professional 
standards of legal service.92 The inability of a frustrated beneficiary to bring a claim would mean that 
these important public professional functions could be negligently performed with impunity. Similar 
concerns emerge in the judgment of Lord Brown-Wilkinson asserting that ‘the solicitor by accepting 
the instructions [of the testator] has entered upon, and therefore assumed responsibility for, the 
task’.93  In other words, the public importance of the professional role at a general level justifies the 
imposition of a duty of care in an individual instance notwithstanding the lack of formal 
correspondence to traditional contractual and tortious principles. White v Jones thus highlights how 
the understanding of professional status increasingly carries with it a presumption that an individual 
remedy in relation to professional misconduct can serve important public functions. This is a stance 
of particular significance with regard to the arguments propounded below. 
 
4 Professionalism, policing and the courts     
                                                          
89 Ibid at 728 (per Lord Hope). 
90 [1995] 2 AC 207. 
91 Ibid at 260.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid at 274. 
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It has already been acknowledged that policing stands outside the archetypal professions of law and 
medicine in relation to which professional negligence principles have traditionally been developed. 
Indeed, until the second half of the twentieth century, tort engaged not with policing as a profession 
or occupation but with individual office holders, drawing on a historical legacy deriving from the 
‘office of constable’ (along with the ‘original’ authority that office conferred).94 The development of 
a police organisational identity during the nineteenth and twentieth century gradually changed the 
nature of the police constable’s role and his relation to the community to which he was formally 
accountable. Remarkably though, until the second half of the twentieth century, the formal legal and 
policy position was that officers did not act as servants or agents of government bodies,95 and the 
vicarious liability of Chief Constables for the tortious acts of police officers was not introduced until 
the Police Act 1964.   
It should not therefore be surprising to learn that negligence claims against the police for failing 
adequately to carry out their core functions of investigating and suppressing crime only began to 
emerge in the second half of the twentieth century. Some kinds of claims, involving the negligence 
of individual officers, for example in managing a dangerous traffic situation, were easily absorbed 
within the core doctrinal framework.96 Even the Hillsborough claim, alleging that police negligence, 
in the form of poor crowd control, led to the death of numerous football fans in the Hillsborough 
stadium, did not present difficulties other than the extent to which the duty of care the police plainly 
owed in relation to physical harm extended to encompass psychiatric harm.97 However, when 
Jacqueline Hill’s mother lodged her claim against the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police for 
failing to prevent her daughter from being murdered by a notorious serial killer, who (as it turned 
out) the police had interviewed numerous times before Ms Hill was murdered, she broke new 
ground.98 Mrs Hill sought to call the police to account for the lack of due care and skill they exhibited 
in carrying out their core investigative and crime-suppressing functions. It was not that they had 
carried out a negligent act while engaged in policing activities; it was that their policing per se was 
negligent: the police had failed to meet the standards of policing to which Mrs Hill and her daughter 
were entitled to expect. 
The way in which this novel claim was approached in Hill has turned out to be of huge significance. 
From a doctrinal perspective, the issue was conceived in terms of liability for third party acts. Thus 
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Lord Keith, recognising the indirect nature of the harm alleged, stressed the need for some element 
of ‘proximity of relationship’ over and above the mere fact of foreseeability of harm to warrant 
imposing a duty.99 At the same time, judicial discomfort with recognising a duty of care in Hill clearly 
extended beyond a concern to avoid holding one person liable for the criminal acts of another: it 
was the very fact that the police are charged with preventing criminally inflicted harm that gave 
judges in Hill and subsequent cases pause for thought. Is it in the public interest, Lord Keith 
speculated, to impose liability and thus encourage the police to observe ‘a higher standard of 
care’?100 This is the critical moment when notions of professionalism might have but did not enter 
the realm of consideration – or, at least, not explicitly. As we know, Lord Keith went on to give a 
number of public policy reasons why a duty of care should not be imposed on the police in relation 
to their investigative and crime-suppressing functions;101 and these concerns continued (albeit in 
attenuated form after Brooks)102 to shape the outcome of subsequent litigation at least until 
Michael.103 However, it is Lord Keith’s concluding comments in Hill which are perhaps most 
intriguing:  
I therefore consider that Glidewell LJ, in his judgment in the Court of Appeal… in the present 
case, was right to take the view that the police were immune from an action of this kind on 
grounds similar to those which in Rondel v Worsley … were held to render a barrister 
immune from actions for negligence in his conduct of proceedings in court.104       
This use of the term ‘immunity’ has been the source of much subsequent trouble, drawing strong 
criticism from Lord Toulson in Michael  who observes he would have much preferred if Lord Keith 
had not strayed into the realms of policy at all.105 However, what is interesting for our purposes here 
is the analogy Lord Keith invokes in Hill between barristers, on the one hand, and police officers on 
the other. Rondel v Worsley,106 as we have seen, offers a justification for departing from the general 
principle that professionals owe a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in their professional 
calling based on purported considerations of public interest. The denial of liability in Hill is therefore 
analogically linked to the public nature of the service police perform, and its fundamental 
significance to the community.   
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We have then two rationales which, at the point of Hill, appear to be aligned: the argument from 
principle, which draws upon prevailing notions of when a duty of care should be imposed, and relies 
in particular on the notion of proximity; and the argument from policy, or public interest, which 
purports to justify an immunity from application of ordinary common law principles. This contingent 
alignment in Hill belies a tension at the heart of Lord Keith’s argument which is how far 
considerations of public interest should override the application of ordinary common law when 
policy and principle veer in different directions. This tension is subsequently laid bare in Osman v 
Ferguson,107 another case in which the police failed to protect a crime victim, this time in 
circumstances where they were aware both of the risk to a particular victim and from whom the risk 
emanated. In Osman, the application of principle appeared to point in favour of a duty, McCowan LJ 
observing: ‘In my judgment the plaintiffs have therefore an arguable case that as between the 
second plaintiff and his family, on the one hand, and the investigating officers, on the other, there 
existed a very close degree of proximity amounting to a special relationship.’108 This finding 
notwithstanding, the Court of Appeal went on to hold that for the policy reasons outlined in Hill, no 
duty arose.109 In other words, policy trumped principle, or, to express it in terms similar to those 
which featured in Hill, the public interest in effective policing justified a regime of special protection 
for police officers regardless of what a purely principled analysis would dictate. 
This protectionist approach continued in Brooks and Smith.  Brooks is quite a different kind of claim 
from that in Hill and Osman in that the alleged negligence lies not in a police failure to protect an 
individual from third party criminal acts but from failings in the handling of the subsequent 
investigation.  Essentially, what Duwayne Brooks was alleging was that the police had treated him 
unprofessionally.110 Specifically they had breached a common law duty to take reasonable steps (1) 
to assess whether he was the victim of a crime and then to accord him reasonably appropriate 
protection, support, and assistance, (2) to afford him the protection, assistance and support 
commonly afforded to a key eye-witness to a serious crime of violence and (3) to afford reasonable 
weight to the account that he gave of events and to act on it accordingly.111  These claims have more 
than a whiff of allegations of professional misconduct. Moreover, and this point of critical 
importance is sadly dismissed by their Lordships,112 resolution of the claim in Brooks is in no way 
                                                          
107 [1993] 4 All ER 344 (CA). 
108 Ibid at 350. 
109 Per McCowan LJ ‘In my judgment the House of Lord’s decision on public policy in Hill dooms this action to 
failure’ (at 354).  
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reliant on the legal principles pertaining to liability for third party criminal acts. Yet, the court 
repeatedly invoke the ‘the principle in Hill’s case’113 to deny a cause of action. Reliance on 
policy/public interest here is absolute and further problematised by the fact that, at the time Brooks 
was heard, Rondel v Worsley had already been overturned by Hall v Simon.114 Their Lordships handle 
this (as well as the difficulty with the European Court of Human Rights triggered by Lord Keith’s 
formulation of the approach in Hill as an ‘immunity’ rather than as ‘an absence of a duty of care’)115 
by holding out the possibility that a police duty of care might be recognised in some notional 
unspecified future circumstances.116 In the meantime, the desirability of having police officers treat 
victims and witnesses properly is reframed by Lord Steyn as an ‘ethical value’ which does not extend 
to a legal duty to take care.117  
Perhaps sensing that this is an unsatisfactory base upon which to ground an expectation that the 
police treat people properly, Lord Rodgers offers some interesting further elaboration of the nature 
of police duties in this regard. ‘Police officers’, he argues, are ‘under an ethical and professional duty 
to act with due care’.118 It is, he continues, ‘a matter of professional ethics but does not translate 
into a legal duty of care to the defendant’.119 What work is the notion of professionalism doing in 
this context? In our view, its purpose is to imbue the appeal to ethics with additional weight by 
attaching it to professional standards: because the police have a professional duty, they do not have 
a legal one, the mediation of public (collective) interest and private (individual) justice being 
achieved by invoking the moral purpose of the professional actor.  
In Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police120 this tension between public and private, collective and 
individual interests, is even further exposed in the courts’ deliberations. The facts in Smith might be 
thought to present exactly that kind of ‘outrageous’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstance envisaged by Lord 
Steyn in Brooks as falling beyond the reach of the Hill principle. A case of domestic violence in which 
the police repeatedly ignored and downplayed the concerns of the claimant, who was later subject 
to  a serious attack by his ex-partner, Smith evidences an unforgivable level of negligence on the part 
of the police – and their Lordships knew it. Thus Lord Hope laments the ‘highly regrettable failure [by 
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the police] to react to a prolonged campaign … threatening the use of extreme criminal violence’121 
while Lord Phillips explicitly acknowledges that ‘the lack of action on the assumed facts of this case 
come close to constituting the “outrageous negligence” that Lord Steyn contemplated as being 
potentially outside the reach of the principle in Hill’s case’. 122   
Nevertheless, and with the exception of Lord Bingham, the House turned its back on individual 
justice and reasserted the public interest in legally uninhibited policing in uncompromising terms.  
According to Lord Hope, the principle in Hill, defended so vigorously by Lord Steyn in Brooks, ‘had 
been enunciated in the interests of the whole community’, with ‘the greater public good 
outweigh[ing] any individual hardship’.123 These points are endorsed by Lord Carswell who appeals 
to ‘the interests of the wider community’ to justify the hardship that the Hill principle inflicts on 
individual claimants.124 By contrast, Lord Bingham has reached the limits of his tolerance of the 
injustice that Hill appears to necessitate, arguing strongly for an exception in the form of his ‘liability 
principle’, understood in the following terms: 
If a member of the public (A) furnishes a police officer (B) with apparently credible evidence 
that a third party whose identity and whereabouts are known presents a specific and 
imminent threat to his life or physical safety, B owes A a duty to take reasonable steps to 
assess such a threat and, if appropriate, take reasonable steps to prevent it being 
executed’.125  
While perhaps not the most elegantly crafted solution to the dilemma of justice posed by Hill, the 
narrow scope of Lord Bingham’s liability principle presents the possibility of tempering the over-
inclusiveness of Hill without fundamentally threatening the public policy concerns asserted to 
underpin it.  Moreover, as Lord Bingham himself points out, public policy concerns also militate in 
favour of redress: ‘the public policy consideration which has the first claim on the loyalty of the law 
is that wrongs should be remedied and very potent considerations are required to override that 
policy’.126  Strikingly, that point seems to have been lost in much of the discussion of the scope and 
application of the Hill principle. Of greater significance for our purposes here is Lord Bingham’s 
remarks about how the liability principle might be operationalised as a legal standard. Responding to 
the criticisms of his judicial brethren that the principle is vague and unworkable he says this: 
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Who they ask is to judge whether the evidence is apparently credible? Who is to judge 
whether the threat is imminent? The answer is that given in any case where it is said that a 
professional should have been alerted to and should have responded to a risk. In first 
instance the judgment is made by the professional in question. If that judgment is 
challenged, a judge must decide.127 
In these key comments, the concept of professionalism performs two related tasks. On the one hand 
it allows Lord Bingham to align policing with other professional roles and intimate thereby that 
similar standards of professionalism should apply. On the other hand, it invites the professional to 
play a central role in articulating professional standards, in this context, in judging when evidence is 
credible or a threat assessed to be imminent.  Judicial angst about the appropriateness of interfering 
in matters of operational policing is thereby at least potentially diffused, although sadly for Mr 
Smith, not sufficiently to prompt their Lordships to accept Lord Bingham’s compromise. The 
conclusion of Smith is thus highly unsatisfactory as the ‘Hill principle’ drifts even further away from 
its original moorings, losing sight of its purpose, scope and limitations in the broader context of civil 
justice. 
 
5 The police as ‘professionals’ 
To recap so far, we have seen that professionalism is a nebulous and contested concept which varies 
over time and place, both in meaning and significance. We have explored the implications of 
professional status for standards of legal liability, noting a judicial shift away from a traditional 
protective stance towards a greater willingness to challenge and scrutinise professional practices.  
We have examined the existing case law to see whether and how notions of professionalism inform 
judicial decision-making about police liability. We have found that professionalism does figure, 
though not significantly, in the relevant legal judgments but also that it has been invoked both for 
and against recognition of a duty of care in relation to core police functions. At this point we 
propose to probe the idea of the police as professionals a bit further - to consider what professional 
policing means and what the police seek to gain from making claims to professional status. This 
might help in determining whether recognition of a duty of care is, or ought to be, an inherent 
feature of police claims to professionalism.  
Many aspects of policing have historically shared characteristics with the rough sketch of 
professionalism set out above.  Although policing is a necessarily contested and conflict-ridden 
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process, the police are commonly understood to operate in the public interest. In addition, as ‘street 
level bureaucrats’, officers on the beat have always had considerable control over their work and 
exercise high levels of discretion.128 Furthermore and subject to some exceptions, the police have 
tended to adopt the view that those with operational experience are best placed to judge officers’ 
conduct. 129 Further still, in line with Friedson’s characterisation of professionalism as a ‘secular 
calling’, Herbert notes how police adherence to a ‘bad apple’ view of criminal activity as morally 
repugnant, permits them to construct their own role as a ‘virtuous attempt to protect an otherwise 
vulnerable public’.130  
Police claims to professionalism have received significant parliamentary backing in recent years. In 
2010 the Coalition Government ordered a Review of Police Leadership and Management.131 In 
response the College of Policing was established in 2012 as a professional body for policing with 
responsibility for overseeing entry qualifications and overall ‘professional development’.132 In this 
capacity it has recently announced the licensing of officers with particular expertise in child sex 
abuse cases133 and an expectation that by 2020 all entrants into the police will be graduates.134 
Furthermore, the College maintains a register of all officers who  have been dismissed from the 
police service, or who resign or retire while subject to gross misconduct investigation135 and this has 
been given formal statutory footing as a ‘police barred list’ which prevents those on the list from 
being re-employed as officers.136  The existence and work of the College contributes substantially to 
those structural arrangements which are the hallmark of professions. It incorporates both the 
management processes associated with instilling the discipline of professionalism from above, and is 
increasingly the structural embodiment of the claim to professionalism from within. The status of 
the College itself is consequently important as regards the professional standing of the police; 
significantly, there have been recent calls in Parliament to rename it the Royal College of Policing.137    
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What then are the characteristics of a professional officer? What important qualities (over and 
above the structural mechanisms in place) justify professional status? Muir’s classic study of police 
as ‘streetcorner politicians’ classifies the professional officer as one whose intellectual approach to 
interactions with the public is infused with an understanding of the complexity of human relations 
and social interdependence and who can incorporate the use of coercive force within an overarching 
moral code.138 This involves substantial situational expertise, leading to a nuanced appreciation of 
the police role encompassing the ability to ‘extort’ compliance with requests. Muir’s professional 
officers realise ‘that however degenerate a person might appear, they would still value something or 
someone or some idea that if threatened would coax them into compliance’.139 In other words, a key 
element of the expertise of professional officers lies in an ability to build relationships which 
facilitate the acquisition of operationally pertinent information.  
Reiner recognises the same type of officer but uses the label ‘bobby’ for that set of ‘professional’ 
characteristics.140 For Reiner the professional officer adopts a managerial approach to the role: ‘The 
keynote to this category is “judiciousness”’.141 Professional officers ‘exhibit an appropriately 
balanced appreciation of the value of all aspects of policing’ and are equipped for the ‘largely public 
relations functions of senior ranks’.142 Hence the ‘professional’ nature of policing can vest in both 
the  nuanced individual or local relationships highlighted by Muir and the ability to foster the general 
public confidence in the police as an organisation emphasised in Reiner’s characterisation.  This 
aligns with an understanding of the complex nature of policing which recognises that the police seek 
specific order by limiting and controlling particular incidents of criminal conduct and breaches of the 
peace while also contributing to general order by their symbolic role as regards social cohesion.143 
However, these two critical elements of policing are neither distinct nor indeed separable. 
If we accept policing as a professional endeavour, it is nonetheless distinct from other professions 
because of the unique extent to which the police are dependent on their relationship with the public 
in order to perform both their specific and general responsibilities. While ultimately they can resort 
to the use of state-sanctioned force, they are in practice dependent on compliance with requests as 
regards day-to-day issues of public order. Further, they rely on the public to come forward with 
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information making their crime control function possible.144 For policing then, the importance of 
those professional elements of expertise and relationship, highlighted in section 2 are specifically 
interwoven and a significant part of the expertise of policing lies in creating, promoting and fostering 
good relationships with the public, individually, through local and community outreach, and through 
efforts to maintain overall public confidence in the police as an institution.  The fact of good 
professional conduct on the part of officers undoubtedly assists with this at every level; but the very 
label of professionalism also has significant instrumental impact and is arguably part of what the 
police seek to gain by asserting professional status.   
From a management perspective, the ability to use claims to professional status as a means of  
‘inscribing the disciplinary logic of professionals’145 is a potential means of influencing police 
occupational culture in positive ways. Similarly, while calls from within the police for recognition of 
professional status no doubt encompass a desire for the prestige associated with the classic model,  
such recognition also has other advantages. These include justifying limited external scrutiny.146 
However, professional status can also serve ‘deeply functional’ operational ends.147 Officers have to 
face emotionally charged and violent, or potentially violent, situations. They perceive the ability to 
take command and ‘dictate the flow of action’ as limiting their vulnerability in such circumstances.148 
The additional authority required to achieve this is not born of their coercive powers alone or of all 
those elements of good policing that are aligned with professional conduct, but also stems from the 
status consequent upon being seen as a profession. In sum, while the police do have authority by 
virtue of their office and powers, claims to professional standing are claims for a different, additional 
level of authority. Claims to professionalism are claims to a certain form of legitimacy which is 
founded on a degree of competence in a particular area and needs to be continuously negotiated.149 
An issue to consider then is whether being subject to a duty of care in negligence would assist in that 
‘negotiation’. 
 
6 The role of the duty of care in the negotiation of police professional status  
6.1 Professional policing and public policy considerations 
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The importance of the status of the police to processes of policing bears on the legal arguments 
regarding the imposition of a duty of care with respect to core police functions.  Consider first the 
‘Hill principle’, at the heart of which is a determination that the interests of the community as a 
whole are not served by acknowledging a police duty of care owed to individual members of the 
public. This breaks down into four related policy arguments reflected in the relevant judgments.150 
These are: (1) that the imposition of a duty would not improve police standards; (2) that to impose a 
duty would be detrimental (to the public at large) because it might result in defensive policing 
strategies; (3) that the operational independence of the police renders police decision-taking 
unjusticiable; and (4) that to permit a duty would unhelpfully divert police resources towards dealing 
with the resultant litigation.  Significantly, each of these arguments presupposes that the interests of 
individual claimants must cede to the collective interest in effective policing. The judicial approach is 
to ‘balance’ the interests in conflict, determining in favour of the more weighty concern. Is this 
however the right/best way to frame the dilemma these cases appear to pose? Arguably, such 
reiterations of interests in conflict fails to recognise the interdependency of collective and individual 
concerns in the context of modern policing, the extent to which, as explored above, professional 
policing requires relationship-building at the individual/community level and public confidence at 
the social/institutional level.  By drawing out the tensions and complexities which the process of 
policing entails, the lens of professionalism enables us to interrogate the structure and content of 
judicial postulations which have not received the scrutiny they warrant, given the work they have 
been called upon to perform in the courtroom.      
Let’s look again at first two policy considerations, namely, that a duty of care would not lead to an 
improvement in standards and could encourage defensive policing. One of the potential benefits to 
the police of the imposition of professionalism from above is that it engenders the development of 
mechanisms of self-governance, encouraging individual officers to exercise personal discipline and 
thus achieve the ‘professional standards’ required by the organisation. In this context, the 
imposition of a duty of care could constitute one such disciplinary mechanism, helping to set and 
maintain professional standards in the context of police interactions with members of the public.   
Seeking to achieve this is arguably of greater significance in the context of policing than in other 
professional contexts.  I may reach a full recovery sooner and my overall suffering may be reduced 
on account of the sense of wellbeing imparted by my surgeon demonstrating genuine interest in and 
concern for my welfare. However, as long as she has performed the surgery within acceptable 
boundaries of technical skill, the lack of ‘true professionalism’ manifest in her clear indifference to 
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me as a person is not appropriately the subject of suit. The difference between surgery and policing 
however is that, for the latter, the quality of the relationship is fundamental to the process at every 
level. Thus, invoking law to set at least the outer limits of acceptable conduct could very likely lead 
to improvements in (professional) standards.    
Similar arguments can be made in relation to defensive policing. The judicial concern here is that the 
ability of the police to make sound operational decisions will be impeded by the fear of litigation, 
tilting the balance unduly in favour of individual as opposed to collective considerations.151 However, 
policing is a necessarily public and - in an era of smartphones and attentiveness to social media –  
increasingly visible activity in which individual interactions often assume more general significance. 
The easy opposition of individual and public interests fits poorly within an operational context in 
which the two are more commonly critically connected. Put simply, if we recognise that reputational 
and relational issues are at the forefront of professional policing, ‘defensive’ and ‘professional’ 
policing look more in alignment than in tension. In any event, fears about the untold damage 
inflicted by the threat of litigation have not been borne out in other professional contexts.152   
The final two policy considerations comprising the ‘Hill principle’ relate to organisational aspects of 
policing. One concern here is that being subject to a duty of care would result in limited police 
resources being directed towards defending negligence claims and thereby diverted from core police 
tasks. In this regard Tofaris and Steel rightly point out that the depth of investigation and disclosure 
required for litigation may bring about positive improvements in police practice as well as savings in 
overall public resources.153 The relationship between complaints investigations and claims for 
damages for intentional torts provides some empirical evidence that their suggestions are valid. In 
particular, studies in the US have revealed that the heightened level of scrutiny inherent in the 
litigation process often brings to light significant failings in internal complaints investigations.154 
While, there are other factors to consider in relation to the level of investigation in the context of 
police complaints, this evidence certainly heightens the need for those who argue that the 
imposition of a duty of care in a narrow range of circumstances would be detrimental, to produce 
evidence in support of that contention. In any event, we would argue that a commitment to the 
imposition of professional discipline from above should entail welcoming the additional scrutiny. 
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Perhaps the most compelling policy concern expressed in Hill and subsequent cases relates to the 
appropriateness of subjecting police conduct and decision-making to judicial scrutiny. That the 
imposition of a duty of care would involve inappropriate judicial examination of matters of policy 
and the exercise of police discretion is correctly seen as an issue of justiciability.155 However, 
according to Tofaris and Steel, the prevailing judicial approach to determinations of justiciability 
does not and should not preclude judicial oversight of policing in all circumstances.156 In particular, 
while resourcing decisions and questions of strategy properly fall outside the bounds of justiciability, 
operational negligence, taking the form of poor policing by individual officers, arguably should not. It 
is true that in most of the cases which have come before the courts, strategic and resourcing factors 
lurk in the factual background; however, the nature of the negligence alleged is primarily 
operational: consider for example the poor handling of Mr Smith’s complaint or the failure of 
communications systems which doomed Ms Michael’s 999 call to inattention.   
We would argue that the wide application of justiciability considerations and the corresponding 
accountability gap this creates undermines and impedes police claims to professional status. The 
claim to professionalism entails a representation of a degree of care and skill which is considerably 
higher than the bar set by Wednesbury unreasonableness (judicial review being the other primary 
legal mechanism for challenging police decision-making). This is not to deny that policing is complex 
and challenging, as is generally the case with professional roles. However, this does not mean that 
some degree of judicial oversight will not aid rather than inhibit good policing. For example, Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) recently published a report which was highly critical 
of the systems put in place by the Metropolitan Police as regards child sexual exploitation.157 Recent 
years have seen a change in how this crime is perceived which impacts significantly on the 
appropriate police response. Successful prosecutions of sex-grooming gang members in Oxford were 
predicated on an understanding of the offence as serious organised crime rather than the easily 
dismissible individual complaints of underage ‘slappers’.158 This resulted in the deployment of 
entirely different investigative approaches than had hitherto been considered; it appears, however, 
these have not been successfully adopted by the Metropolitan Police.159 In its response to the HMIC 
report, the Met pointed to the large number of operational strategies it had prioritised and how 
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these had had important (albeit incidental) positive impacts on child safety.160 This puts resource 
allocation front and centre of the Met’s response, quite properly raising questions of justiciability in 
this context.  
This does not mean that negligence law may not have a role to play even in these circumstances. The 
issue of policing priorities is enormously complex and dependent on a variety of long-term aims and 
short-term crises.  Many diffuse concerns inform how the police focus their operational endeavours 
but professional policing encourages an approach to operational decision-making which aspires to 
high standards and is reflective about best practice in the field. Being subject to a duty of care in 
some circumstances does not have to entail intrusion into territory which should rightly be beyond 
judicial reach. It does however increase the pool of resources, the breadth of information about past 
institutional and operational failings, informing the exercise of reasonable care and professional 
judgment in individual cases in which justiciability considerations are not present.   
6.2 Professional policing and arguments from principle 
If considerations of professionalism militate against the public policy concerns underpinning the Hill 
principle, what, if any, implications do they have for the principle-based approach recently adopted 
in Michael?161 It will be recalled that the core of Lord Toulson’s argument is that there is nothing 
about the police which sets them apart from ordinary members of the public when it comes to 
liability for ‘pure omissions’.162 Putting to one side the fact that liability for omissions has not really 
featured in any of the previous case law – certainly not explicitly - it is interesting to reflect upon the 
top down, defendant-centred formulation of the problem by his Lordship. ‘Should the police be held 
liable for omissions when ordinary citizens are not?’ serves here both as a starting point and 
direction of travel. Lord Toulson’s gaze is large scale and abstract, bypassing proximity by framing 
the issue so as to exclude the relational elements and position the police as lone actors in a hostile 
world. Liability cannot arise because there is nothing about the police which sets them apart from 
the tortious principles that apply to ordinary members of the public. The police (understood either 
as individual officers or as an organisation) are the focus rather than the role and process of policing. 
In contrast, Lord Bingham’s liability principle in Smith163 or the formulation favoured by Lord Kerr in 
Michael, which relies on establishing proximity of relationship,164 start from the bottom up. Their 
small scale gaze focuses first on the individual harmed: Could it be right that such egregious failures 
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by the police do not give rise to a duty? They also home directly onto the nature of the relationship 
between the police and the individual litigant. That relationship becomes the focal point of legal 
argument.     
Drawing again on the idea of professional policing, we contend that relationships in all their complex 
and multifaceted instantiations are at the heart of policing; nor can these be easily reduced to, or 
classified in terms of, assumption or non-assumption of responsibility. This point is recognised by 
Lord Kerr in Michael who views the concept of proximity, for all its limitations,165 as better able to 
accommodate the factual specificity of relational configurations.166 It is Lord Kerr too who highlights 
the role of the police as professionals upon whom individuals are entitled to rely in circumstances of 
serious and imminent threat.167   
There are other aspects of the police role which set them apart from ordinary citizens and indeed 
from other types of public protective services. The sheer breadth of the enterprise of policing and 
the special coercive powers that the police are given place them in a unique position when it comes 
to interactions with the public. If, has been argued, professional policing expertise lies primarily in 
the maintenance of good public relations at individual, local and national levels, the complex nature 
of this ongoing and multileveled relational endeavour generates the opportunity of productive 
synergies between any potential private duty owed to individuals and the general duty owed to the 
public at large. Taking White v Jones168 as an example of the productive alignment of individual and 
collective concerns in relation to the determination of liability rules, there is a strong argument for 
applying a similar approach in a policing context. In this context Lord Toulson suggests that there is 
nothing in police powers that sets them apart from any other member of the public.169 However, in 
White v Jones it was not solicitors’ ‘powers’ that were significant in driving the motivation to find a 
way to overcome the legal constraints to the imposition of a duty of care. It was not that they were 
empowered or licensed by their membership of the law society to undertake the drafting of wills. It 
was the public importance of that professional function. The consequences at a macro level of that 
function being negligently performed with impunity resulted in the imposition of the private law 
duty as a matter of necessity. 
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The formulation adopted by Lord Brown Wilkinson in White v Jones that the public importance of 
the professional role justified a duty of care for omissions in circumstances where there was ‘a 
conscious assumption of responsibility for the task rather than a conscious assumption of legal 
liability to the plaintiff for its careful performance’170 is of particular value here. We are alive to the 
tremendous individual and organisational challenges that policing entails and are not arguing for a 
broad and unmanageable duty of care. What we are suggesting is that the increased professionalism 
within the police and the courts’ changing approach to professional liability make it difficult to 
sustain the argument that the police should not owe a duty of care in negligence at least in some 
circumstances. Moreover, where the police are enjoying the enhanced authority and associated 
instrumental benefits of professional status, there is a role for the courts in providing some check on 
the provision of those professional services as it does in relation to other professional groups.  
 
7 Conclusion 
In this article we have used the lens of professionalism to interrogate the arguments advanced in the 
courts against recognising a private law duty of care on the police in relation to their core 
investigative and crime-suppressing functions.  It is our contention that police claims for professional 
status enhance rather than weaken the case for recognising a duty of care although we agree that 
such a duty should be carefully circumscribed along the lines outlined by Lord Kerr in Michael, who 
calls for a return  to ‘the true rationale of the Hill case… that liability should not attach to the police 
unless there is a relationship of proximity…’.171It is our view that on balance, police claims to 
professionalism tilt the legal and policy arguments in favour of imposing a duty of care on the police 
in relation to their investigative and crime-suppressing functions at least in some instances.   
Further, since claims to professionalism are claims to greater legitimacy based on a level of 
expertise, it is not only right that the police should be subject to some duty of care; but such claims 
to enhanced status will actually be diminished by an ongoing refusal to accept a modicum of judicial 
oversight in relation to professional standards.  
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